Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the effect of the political regime on fiscal redistribution for a maximum of 144 developed and developing countries between 1960 and 2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention allows us to apply a measure of fiscal redistribution which reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. We find that dictatorial regimes redistribute more than democracies through taxes and transfers. Our empirical findings remain robust across several different specifications and estimation techniques. Subsequently, we employ fiscal policy data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzlingat a first glance -empirical finding. Our results indicate that democracies and dictatorships actually follow different patterns of redistribution. Dictatorships redistribute income mostly through cash transfers, whereas democratic regimes basically rely on public good services (such as health and education) and consequently redistribute income mostly through in-kind public services. We interpret our empirical findings in the context of a simple theoretical framework that builds upon McGuire and Olson (1996) .
Introduction
Governing authorities can affect the distribution of income through a wide range of policy instruments, but most directly through implemented fiscal redistribution (i.e., cash transfers to households and taxes collected from them). Since the political system is a crucial determinant for every governmental policy, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies investigate the interplay between political institutions and fiscal redistribution (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004 ).
According to a strand of the theoretical literature, political institutions that concentrate political power within a narrow segment of the population (i.e., non-democratic regimes) generate less fiscal redistribution and greater inequality, while in contrast democratic regimes redistribute more and produce more egalitarian outcomes (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003) .
1 Another strand of the theoretical literature investigates the impact of political institutions on the allocation of government budget between public goods and cash transfers (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Deacon, 2009; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; McGuire and Olson, 1996) . According to these studies, democracies favor spending on public goods (such as spending on education, health etc.) and consequently redistribute income mostly through in-kind public services, whereas dictatorships favor spending on cash transfers targeted to politically influential groups.
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Starting from Lindert (1994) a number of empirical studies have tested the relationship between political institutions and fiscal policy outcomes. Some studies have employed historical data to investigate the effect of democratization on government spending (e.g., Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Boix 2003; Lindert, 1994; and taxation (Aidt and Jensen 2009a; 2009b) , whereas others rely on modern data in order to examine the relationship under 1 The driving force behind this result is the mechanism highlighted by Romer (1975) , Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) , according to which the lower the income of the median voter, relative to the average income, the higher the demand for fiscal redistribution. Therefore, since in democracy the voting franchise is extended to poorer segments of the population, increasing the distance between the income of the median voter and the average income, the demand for redistribution increases. 2 The intuition behind this theoretical result goes as follows. In non-democratic regimes the political influence is more concentrated and therefore the rational leader will spend the public budget mainly on transfers targeted to politically powerful groups. Spending on a nonexclusive public good does not make sense in such a framework mostly because public good's benefits spills over to non-influential outsiders. In contrast, in democracies the electorate (and the required winning coalition) increases and therefore spending on public good appears to be much more attractive due to the economies of scale inherent in supplying a public good to a larger population (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Deacon, 2009; North et al., 2009) . For an excellent review of this literature see Deacon and Saha (2006) .
consideration (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2015; Baum and Lake, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Mulligan et al., 2004; Profeta et al., 2013) .
Interestingly, the empirical evidence concerning the relationship between the political regime and total tax revenues appears to be mixed. Specifically, Mulligan et al., (2004) and Profeta et al., (2013) fail to provide evidence in favor of a clear-cut link between political institutions and tax policy, whereas Acemoglu et al., (2015) suggest that there is a positive and robust effect of democracy on the size of total tax revenues. Moreover, according to historical studies the extension of the voting franchise that took place in the late 19 th and early 20 th century in Western European countries mostly affected the composition -rather than the size -of tax revenues in favor of direct taxation (see, e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2009b; Aidt and Jensen, 2013) . A clearer pattern appears in the relationship between political institutions and government spending. In particular, democracy seems to exert a positive and significant impact on those government spending accounts that could be viewed as redistributive (e.g., spending on health and education), as well as on specific education and health outcomes (see, e.g., Ansell, 2010; Baum and Lake, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Gallego, 2010; Lindert, 2004) . 3 However, according to Mulligan et al., (2010) non-democratic regimes spend more of their GDP on social security, and redistribute more income -though payroll taxation-compared to democracies. 4 Obviously, both the theoretical and the empirical literature conclude that linking fiscal policy choices to variations in political institutions is a highly complicated research issue. If, on top of that, the research question attempts to address the effect of political institutions on redistribution, as a result of the implemented fiscal policies, then the task becomes even more ambitious. 5 This is because political institutions influence many different aspects of the 3 To the best of our knowledge the only study that provides evidence in favor of a positive effect of totalitarian regimes on education spending is Lott (1999) . Following a similar rationale, Ross (2006) suggests that although democracies spend more money on education and health than non-democracies these benefits are mostly directed to middle -and upper-income groups. 4 More precisely, Mulligan et al., (2010) mostly highlight the importance of economic and demographic factors on social security policies, providing only weak evidence for the effect of political institutions. However, they suggest that if there is any observed difference between democracies and non-democracies, it is that the latter spend a little more of their GDP on social security, and moreover they redistribute more -through payroll taxes-to lower income groups. Recently, Knutsen and Rasmussen (2014) conclude that single-party autocracies, which are characterized by larger winning coalitions compared to monarchies and military regimes (see e.g. Fjelde, 2010) , provide specific type of social policies (such as pension programs) in order to increase their probability of survival. 5 The empirical literature investigating the relationship between political regime and income inequality fails to provide any straightforward result. Specifically, Scheve and Stasavage (2009) , Timmons (2010) and Knutsen (2015) fail to provide any relationship between democracy and economic inequality, whereas Li et al. (1998) verify a negative and significant relationship between civil liberties and income inequality. More recently, Acemoglu et al.
implemented fiscal policy (i.e., the size as well as the composition of the government budget), and moreover income inequality can be affected through many alternative fiscal policy channels.
The feature that distinguishes our analysis from the rest of the literature is that our preferred measure to capture the extend of fiscal redistribution is an outcome -not a fiscal -variable that isolates the most direct fiscal policy channel through which income is redistributed; namely through taxes and cash transfers. More specifically, our main dependent variable in this study equals to the difference between Gini coefficients before taxes and transfers, which reflects the actual effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. 6 Our preferred data are obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) as developed by Frederick Solt (Solt, 2009). 7 It is worth noting that a similar measure of fiscal redistribution has been applied by other researchers in the past, to address though different research questions (see, e.g., Iversen and Soscise, 2006; Milanovic, 2000) .
In turn, we categorize political regimes as democratic or dictatorial, based on three alternative measures developed by Boix et al. (2012) , Cheibub et al. (2010) and Marshall and Jaggers (2010) (i.e., POLITY2) , in order to examine the effect of institutions on fiscal redistribution for a maximum of 144 developed and developing countries over the period of 1960-2010. Our findings provide strong evidence that dictatorial regimes redistribute more than democracies through taxes and cash transfers. This result remains robust across several different specifications and estimation techniques. Among our robustness checks we present instrumental variables estimates that rely on the "democratization in waves" concept developed by Huntington (1993) , as well as the "foreign democratic capital" theory suggested by Persson and Tabellini (2009) , to account for concerns about reverse causality.
Our second contribution in the literature is that in the second part of our empirical analysis we attempt to further illuminate our findings on actual fiscal redistribution by investigating the effect of the political institutions on specific fiscal policy variables. The merit (2015) , using an extensive panel dataset of 128 countries, over the period 1960-2010 provide weak evidence of a negative relationship between democratic institutions and gross income inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers), whereas they fail to establish any kind of relationship with net income inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers). 6 Although a large number of fiscal policy choices (e.g., spending on health, education etc.) may affect income inequality, the only two fiscal policy instruments that by definition affect the difference between gross income inequality and net income inequality are apparently the taxes and the cash transfers that are mediating between market income distribution and net income distribution.
5 of this strategy is twofold. First, we can enlighten the exact fiscal policy channel through which political regimes redistribute income. Second, and more importantly, the combination of findings in both empirical sections allows us to provide some insights for the contradicting findings of the existing literature. To this end, we investigate the impact of political institutions on fiscal revenues as well as on the allocation of government budget between public goods and cash transfers. Our analysis fails to provide evidence in favor of a relationship between political institutions and total tax revenues. 8 In contrast, other empirical findings suggest that democracy exerts a positive and significant impact on government spending on education and health, whereas non-democratic regimes rely heavier on cash transfers. These findings are in accordance with a strand of the theoretical literature which suggests that democracies and dictatorships actually follow different patterns of government spending (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Deacon, 2009; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) . Moreover, these results allow us to clarify the puzzling -at a first glance-empirical result of a positive and robust relationship between dictatorship and actual fiscal redistribution. Since democracies favor in-kind public services (education, health) their fiscal policies choices mostly affect gross income inequality (i.e., Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers). On the other hand, non-democracies rely more heavily on cash transfers that are expected to affect in a direct way net income inequality (i.e., Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers). 9 Therefore actual fiscal redistribution (that equals the difference between gross income inequality and net income inequality) is expected to be higher in non-democratic regimes.
8 Our analysis also suggests that political institutions do not affect the composition of the public budget between direct and indirect tax revenues. 9 A big issue in the relevant literature is whether non-democracies direct cash transfers to the poorer segments of the society in a manner that reduces income inequality. A large number of theoretical studies suggest that since in autocratic regimes citizens have no voting rights, transfers are directed to the politically powerful elites (that compose the so-called minimum winning coalition) increasing, therefore, income inequality. This winning coalition may consist of land owners, soldiers, workers in vital industrial sectors (see e.g. Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2014) or even urban industrial workers (Ansell and Samuels, 2014) . Obviously, available macro data on transfers fail to illuminate the potential targeting of transfers to specific groups of agents. However, we know that a large part of transfers consists of old-age benefits programs that are directed to the elderly, which, according to income distribution statistics, belong to the poorer segments of the population even in developed economies (see e.g. OECD, 2015) . This is one example of progressive redistribution through cash transfers. Along these lines, Mulligan et al., (2010) suggest that non-democratic regimes spend more of their GDP on social security compared to democracies, whereas Knutsen and Rasmussen (2014) develop a detailed framework that investigates how formalized and stable social policies (such as old-age pension schemes) may act as a survival tool that reduces the probability of an autocratic breakdown. At the same time, it has been shown that dictators follow policies that redistribute income in favor of politically powerful elites, not through in cash payments, but mostly through market interventions and rent seeking activities (see e.g. Giuliano et al., 2010) .
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Motivated by this evidence, in section 4 we present a simple theoretical framework in which we interpret our empirical findings. More precisely, building upon Olson (1993; and McGuire and Olson (1996) , we consider an endogenous growth model where the rulerwhether democratically elected or not-decides both the level of the tax rate and the share of the tax revenues directed to public production services. Our results are in line with those obtained by McGuire and Olson (1996) . Rulers that are characterized by a lower encompassing interest in the private consumption of the citizens (and consequently in the productivity of the whole society), direct a lower share of the tax revenues to public production services. In contrast, governments that do care for the function of the private markets direct a larger amount of resources to public production services and extract less from the public funds. 10 According to Olson (1993) , nondemocratic regimes are usually characterized by a lower encompassing interest in the function of the private markets and consequently in the productivity of the economy. 11 Following this rationale our theoretical framework suggests that non-democratic regimes direct a lower share of the tax revenues to public production services compared to democracies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the data and the econometric techniques employed; Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 introduces a theoretical framework that helps us to formalize the testable implications of the relevant literature. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main points.
Data and Empirical Specification.

The Data
Investigating the effect of the political regime on the redistribution of income that takes place through fiscal policies appears to be an extremely ambitious and complicated research question. This is because political institutions influence many different aspects of implemented fiscal policy, and moreover income inequality is affected through many alternative fiscal policy 10 Following the rationale of Olson (1993; and McGuire and Olson (1996) in democracies the prospective majority that is required to win the national elections earns a significant amount of its income in private markets. 11 It must be noted that this view for democracies cannot be taken as a panacea. There are numerous historical examples of dictatorships that followed pro-market policies such as the dictator Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Chung Hee Park and Doo-Hwan Chan in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek and his son in Taiwan and Deng Xiaoping in China. Moreover, Olson (1982) suggests that in many cases democratically elected governments (mostly in mature democratic regimes) are not characterized by a high encompassing interest in the function of the private markets due to the increased political influence of specific interest groups, lobbies and cartels. Following a similar rationale De Luca et al., (2015) show that capital-rich dictators follow policies that generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy.
7 channels. This study focuses on the most direct fiscal policy channel through which authorities redistribute income, namely on fiscal redistribution that takes place through taxes and cash transfers. Following Iversen and Soscise (2006) and Milanovic (2000) , among others, we isolate this channel by taking the difference between gross income inequality (i.e., income inequality before taxes and transfers) and net income inequality (i.e., income inequality after taxes and transfers):
fiscal redistributionit = pretax and transfers Giniit -posttax and transfers Giniit
Our data are obtained by the SWIID, developed by Frederick Solt (Solt, 2009 Ostry et al., 2014; Acemoglu et. al., 2015; Brueckner et al., 2015; De Haan and Sturm, 2015) . Despite the popularity of the SWIID, there has been much debate recently on the quality of its data mostly because of potential problems raised by the aforementioned algorithm that assembles inequality statistics from different sources (see, e.g., Jenkins, 2015; Solt, 2015) . For this reason, through our empirical strategy and robustness checks care is taken to ensure that reliability of our estimates. (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010) . This index has been applied as a tool to classify political regimes (democracy versus autocracy) in number of studies (see e.g., Mulligan et al., (2004) ; Haber and Menaldo, 2011) , though a closer look at it suggests that it mainly focuses on the institutional side of political competition (see, Vanhanen, 2000) . However, it offers the advantage of varying from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy), thus allowing for more within-country variation in the sample. For consistency with the other two measures, the POLITY2 index is reversed and normalised to run from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more authoritarianism.
To ensure robust econometric identification, our analysis employs a number of covariates that are expected to affect fiscal redistribution. In particular, we control for the level of economic development by employing the log of real GDP per capita (denoted as GDP per capita) obtained from the Penn World Tables. According to Wagner's law, we expect richer countries to have larger public sectors, which in turn may affect the extent of fiscal redistribution. Moreover, given that a number of studies have shown a direct effect of democratization on economic growth (see, 12 It is worth noting that Botswana, Fiji, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Zambia are the only other countries in our sample that present significant negative values of fiscal redistribution. Interestingly, these negative values do not exclusively refer to dictatorial regimes, whereas if they are excluded from the empirical analysis the results presented in section 3 remain essentially the same. 13 Both, the CGV and the BMR datasets, are different updates and revisions of the well-established dichotomous classification of regimes introduced in Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) .
e.g., Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2014) controlling for GDP per capita reduces the potential omitted variable bias in our empirical specification. Our next control variable is the dependency ratio of the population (denoted as age dependency). It is measured as the percentage of the population younger than 15 years or older than 64 to the number of people of working age between 15 and 64 years. According to a number of studies, demographic factors consist a basic driving force behind the design of fiscal policy (see, e.g., Lindert, 1994; Mulligan et al., 2004; Mulligan et al., 2010) . Finally, our analysis takes into account the effects of international market integration by including the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (denoted as openness). It is well established in the literature that the demand for spending, especially for income transfer programmes, varies positively with the degree of globalization as a safety net against the exposure to the terms of trade risk (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1997; .
It is worth noting that we have attempted to include in our model a series of other variables, such as the urbanization rate, the population size, the average years of schooling and many others. However, none of these variables had a significant effect on our dependent variable, and due to other concerns as well (correlation of control variables, reduction of sample size), we do not include them in our estimations. 14 Our unbalanced cross-country time series dataset includes observations for a maximum of 144 countries over the period of 1960-2010. 15 A complete list of all variables used in our estimations is provided in the Appendix A.
Econometric Model
To analyse the influence of political institutions on fiscal redistribution, we formulate the following empirical model:
where denotes the dependent variable fiscal redistribution, in country i and year t. The variable ℎ −1 classifies the political regime at year t-1, according to the CGV, BMR, and POLITY2 variables described above. Moreover, −1 includes the additional covariates that 14 All these empirical findings are available upon request. 15 Although we begin with all the countries from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, we exclude from our sample non-independent territories and very small-states (e.g., Andorra, Monaco, Puerto Rico, Timor-Leste, etc.). Subsequently, the sample size was restricted by the availability of the income inequality data. are expected to affect fiscal redistribution. Finally and correspond to country and time fixed effects, respectively, and is the error term. In this specification year t represents the last observation of each 5 year sub-period (1965, 1970,.., 2010) of our sample, whereas year t-1 the first observation of each sub-period (1960, 1966,..,2006 ) (see also Acemoglu et al., 2015) . We follow this specification for three reasons. First, the lagged value of the variable Dictatorship is preferred because we expect its effect not to be contemporaneous. 16 Second, this approach allows us to mitigate concerns of reverse causality running form the explanatory variables to fiscal redistribution. Finally, as already mentioned, Solt (2009) employed a custom missing-data algorithm in order to standardize Gini estimates from all major existing resources of inequality data. In order to minimize reliance on problematic assumptions, Solt (2009) uses as much information as possible from proximate years within the same economy to estimate missing country-year observations. Our empirical specification that uses one observation of each 5 year sub-period of our sample aims to reduce, to the degree possible, the problems from data imputation from observations within the same country.
The model could be dynamic due to the persistence in inequality and fiscal commitments that carry over from one year to the next. To capture this persistence, previous empirical studies have applied dynamic panel specifications (see, e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Amendola et al., 2013) . Following the rationale of this literature, we include a lagged dependent variable in our model estimating the following equation:
We seek a robust method to identify the extent of fiscal redistribution between democratic and dictatorial regimes. To establish baseline results, we estimate equation (2) using the standard within estimator. This method guarantees that our estimates are not contaminated by aggregate shocks and trends common to all countries or by time invariant country-specific characteristics.
In order to estimate equation (3), we cannot rely on a dynamic Fixed Effects (FE) model, since the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimated equation introduces a potential bias by not satisfying the strict exogeneity assumption of the error 16 It should be stressed that alternative empirical strategies, where the variable Dictatorship and/or the controls are entered contemporaneously in the specification, produce the same qualitative results to those discussed in section 3.
As shown in the literature, the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the time length of the panel, even as the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Kiviet, 1995; Nickell, 1981) . The time series length of our panel is on average below 7 observations per country and, hence, the bias is not negligible. To address this issue we rely on the generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panel models, as proposed by HoltzEakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) . This econometric technique removes fixed effects using either first-differencing or forward orthogonal deviations. In our case, we apply the forward orthogonal deviations as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) as follows:
This transformation method essentially subtracts the mean of future observations available in the sample from the first observations, and its main advantage is that it preserves sample size in panels with gaps. Although the model given by equation (4) Although the use of lagged values of the variable Dictatorship in empirical specifications (2) and (4) mitigate concerns of endogeneity to some extent, it does not resolve the issue. To further dispel these concerns, in section 3.2.3 we adopt a 2SLS identification strategy. The challenge in our case is to find an external instrument that affects fiscal redistribution only through its effect on the political regime. Along these lines, we consider regional democratic diffusion as an attractive source of exogenous variation for the determination of the domestic political regime (see also Acemoglu et al., 2015) .
Results
Baseline Results
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1 . In columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 we report the estimates of equation (2) where each time the variable fiscal redistribution is regressed on one of the three alternative measures of Dictatorship, as well as on the additional covariates. As can be seen, in all alternative specifications Dictatorship bears a positive and highly significant coefficient highlighting the positive effect of non-democratic political institutions on fiscal redistribution. It should be stressed that focusing on the within-country effects of the political regime enables us to account for time-invariant country characteristics such as geography and social norms that may affect fiscal redistribution. However, it is also true that our estimates rely on countries for which the type of the political regime changes over time. For this reason, in
Appendix B we provide a list of political regime changes according to the CGV and BMR dichotomous variables for which within-country variation in is significantly lower in comparison to the continuous index POLITY2. As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned, we observe that their sign and statistical significance is consistent with our theoretical priors.
[Insert Table 1 , here]
Moving one step forward, in columns (4) to (9) of Table 1 we add the lagged dependent variable into the set of controls. In columns (5), (7) and (9), we use the GMM estimator as described in equation (4), whereas in columns (4), (6) and (8) To obtain the long-run effect in the dynamic specification, the coefficient of the variable Dictatorship is divided by (1 -fiscal redistributiont-1). According to the GMM estimates, the long-run effect is comparable to the static specification lying between 1.96 and 2.26 points.
Given that the mean value of absolute fiscal redistribution in the sample is 5.25 points (with a standard deviation of 5.58), it is clear that this effect I s quantitatively sizable.
Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section, we explore the robustness of our baseline empirical findings presented in Table 1 . First, we check if our results are influenced by outlier observations. Second, we consider the possibility that our estimates are driven by the most noisy/unreliable inequality data.
Third, we test if our results survive when ex-communist countries are dropped from the estimates. Fourth, we add into the set of the control variables gross income inequality. In that way, we can exclude the possibility that our results are driven by differences in market inequality between democratic and dictatorial regimes. Finally, we take an instrumental variables approach in order to mitigate further concerns for potential endogeneity and omitted variable bias in our results.
Testing for outliers
Our first step in the sensitivity analysis is to ensure that our findings are not influenced by outlier observations. For this reason, we re-estimate equations (2) and (4) Table   2 we replicate the static FE estimates of Table 1 , whereas in columns (4) to (6) we replicate the GMM estimates of Table 1 . By repeating the regressions without the identified outlier observations we drop up to 34% of our sample. As can be easily verified, Dictatorship bears again a positive and highly significant coefficient. However, we note that the implied long-run effect of the variable Dictatorship on fiscal redistribution is much lower in comparison to Table   1 . Moreover, as expected, the R-squared of the FE estimates has significantly been improved by the exclusion of the outliers. Regarding the rest of the control variables, in Table 2 our empirical findings are in line to those depicted in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 2 , here]
Income inequality estimates
As already mentioned, the SWIID takes stock simultaneously from a large number of income inequality datasets, through a multiple imputation procedure, in order to maximize comparability and data coverage of Gini indices. Despite the popularity and wide coverage of the SWIID, an intense discussion has arisen lately for its suitability on cross-country analysis of income inequality (see, Jenkins, 2015; Solt, 2015) . As Jenkins (2015) argues, the aforementioned imputation procedure that assembles inequality data from different sources raises serious issues for the comparability and harmonization of Gini indices across countries and time. His critique follows in Atkinson and Brandolini's (2001, 2009) footsteps, who review the pitfalls encountered in the utilization of secondary income inequality datasets. However, Solt (2015) objects that 'the
SWIID incorporates Atkinson and Brandolini's recommendations to provide the most comparable data available for those engaged in broadly cross-national research on income inequality'.
An additional advantage of the SWIID is the provision of both gross and net Gini indices that enables the calculation of the variable fiscal redistribution which is at the centre of this particular research project. However, as shown by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) and Jenkins (2015) , econometric results based on inequality statistics are likely to be affected by the choice of the dataset. They recommend checking the robustness of the empirical results using data from alternative sources, as well as mentioning the potential drawbacks related to the choice of a specific dataset. An alternative source in our case could have been the World Income Inequality Database (UNO-WIDER, 2014) that lately increased substantially the coverage of gross and net Gini indices, thus enabling the calculation of a similar measure of fiscal redistribution. However, the increased coverage does not particularly apply to developing economies, where a considerable amount of within-country variation in the type of the political regime is observed in our sample. Therefore, in our case we cannot use any alternative data source which is comparable to the SWIID in terms of coverage, quality and comparability.
To this end, our empirical strategy, as described in section 2.2, was adjusted to incorporate issues related to the custom missing algorithm employed by Solt (2009) , whereas in this subsection we perform three checks in order to ensure the reliability of our estimates. First, although the SWIID maximizes the comparability of available income inequality data, incomparability remains and it is reflected in the standard errors reported for the available observations contained in the database. The provision of standard errors is an additional advantage of the SWIID, because a large part of the uncertainty of the inequality estimates can be taken into account. Therefore, in order to increase the reliability of our results, we drop from regressions 10% of the observations that the variable redist is associated with the higher standard errors. 19 Second, we drop from our sample all Sub-Saharan Africa countries, because we expect the accuracy of the inequality data to be thinner in comparison to the rest of our sample. Third, for the same reason, we drop from our estimates the first two decades of our sample.
[Insert Table 3 , here]
As shown in panels A, B and C of Table 3 , our results regarding the effect of the political regime on fiscal redistribution are very similar to those obtained in Table 1 .
Dropping ex-communist countries
Our next test is to estimate our preferred specifications after excluding the ex-communistic countries from the estimates. The purpose of this test is twofold. First, such dictatorships may appear more 'redistributive' just on account of the scale of state involvement in the economy.
Hence, this group of countries, which move towards pro-market policies and less state involvement after democratisation, might be crucial for the positive impact of dictatorial regimes on fiscal redistribution. Second, we drop Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries, because the dynamics of inequality following the fall of the communist rule are probably different from other democratizations observed in our sample. Related to this point, an additional concern is that the sharp changes of Gini estimates in these countries might reflect to greater extent measurement problems of market inequality, rather than realised changes on income inequality. As can be seen in Table 4 , our qualitative results are in line to those depicted in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 4 , here]
Adding gross income inequality in the set of control variables
Our next robustness check is to add in the set of the control variables gross income inequality.
According to Meltzer and Richard (1981) higher levels of income inequality (i.e., larger distance between the median and the average income) lead to increased demand for fiscal redistribution.
Therefore, gross income inequality is expected to exert a positive impact on fiscal redistribution.
Moreover, controlling for gross income inequality our analysis seeks to isolate a large number of potential fiscal policy channels through which political institutions may affect income redistribution. As we have already discussed, democracy exerts a positive impact on specific government spending accounts (such as government spending on health and education) that are expected to affect directly gross income inequality (see, e.g., Ansell, 2010; Baum and Lake, 2001; Gallego, 2010) . Therefore, by including gross income inequality in our set of controls, our analysis mitigates a large number of potential fiscal policy channels that may introduce significant noise to the obtained empirical findings.
[Insert Table 5 , here]
In Table 5 we replicate the static FE estimates and the GMM estimates of Table 1 . As can be seen, the empirical results regarding the variable Dictatorship remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 1 . Moreover, gross income inequality enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient in columns (1) to (3). This finding is in accordance with the rationale developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) , which suggests that more unequal countries are expected to redistribute more. However, this result becomes statistically insignificant in columns (4) to (6) when the lagged dependent variable enters in the specification with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. 20 Regarding the rest of the controls variables, once again age dependency bears a positive and statistically coefficient in all specifications highlighting the robust effect of demographic factors on fiscal redistribution.
The 2SLS identification strategy
The empirical strategy with the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimated equation, in addition to the full set of country and time fixed effects, rules out certain types of contaminating factors for our results. However, one could still argue that our results can be affected by potential reverse causality running from fiscal redistribution to the political regime, by the measurement error of the alternative regime-type variables that we use in our empirical analysis as well as potential omitted variable bias. To deal with these concerns, in this subsection we follow a 2SLS identification strategy.
The challenge in our case is to find an instrument that is adequately correlated with the regime within the country, while it remains uncorrelated with the unobserved time-varying component that affects fiscal redistribution. In other words, we need a variable that affects fiscal redistribution only through its effect on the regime within the country. Following the "democratization in waves" concept developed by Huntington (1993) , as well as the "foreign democratic capital" theory suggested by Persson and Tabellini (2009) , we conclude that regional democratic diffusion appears to be an attractive source of exogenous variation in the determination of the domestic regime. To this end, we apply the inverse distance weighting formula in order to develop the variable Democracy abroad for country i in year t as follows:
where Djt classifies the political regime in country j (different from i) according to the CGV, BMR, and POLITY2 variables described above. Moreover, Wij is the inverse distance in kilometres between the capitals of country i and j. Therefore, our instrument takes values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating that a country has more democratic countries in the geographic neighbourhood. More than that, a wave of democratization that takes place within a geographic neighbourhood is expected to increase the value of through time. It is worth that Acemoglu et al. (2015) have applied a similar instrument in their study to tackle the aforementioned econometric issues, whereas Ansell (2010) and Aidt and Jensen (2013) , as in our case, add the lagged value of the instrumented variable in the vector of instruments.
In Table 6 we re-estimate our basic specification as described in equation (2), with and without the inclusion of the variable gross income inequality. More precisely, in columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 we re-estimate our basic specification presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 , whereas in columns (4) to (6) we add in the set of the control variables gross income inequality.
We abstain from employing a dynamic specification, since the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation introduces a potential bias in our estimates (see, e.g., Nickell, 1981) . The first-stage results are reported in the lower part of the Table 6 .
As can be easily verified, the positive effect of the variable Dictatorship continues to hold in all specifications. Moreover, the coefficient of the variable Democracy Abroad bears the expected negative sign and it is statistically significant in 4 out of 6 regressions. The consistency of the 2SLS model requires that the instruments are strong enough and valid to predict the endogenous variable Dictatorship. For this reason, first we refer to the first stage F-statistics of the excluded instruments. According to Staiger and Stock (1997) , the first stage F-statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be a problem. As can be seen, the first-stage F statistics in Table 6 are high enough to guard against the problem of weak instruments. Second, since the number of excluded instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables, a
Hansen test statistic can be calculated to test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid and thus uncorrelated with the error term. In all cases the overidentification test does not reject the null hypothesis, giving some confidence in the overall set of instruments.
[Insert Table 6 , here]
The results reported in Table 6 verify once again the positive effect of the variable Dictatorship on fiscal redistribution. However, one could still argue that the exclusion restriction can be violated if the regime type abroad relates to redistribution abroad, and the latter has direct spillover effects on the dependent variable. To exclude this possibility, we control in the 2SLS models for Redistribution abroad. Even in that case our results -available upon request-are similar to those obtained in Table 6 . It is worth noting that the 2SLS coefficients of the variable Dictatorship are higher than those obtained with the within estimator. We interpret the larger coefficients in the 2SLS estimates as a possible measurement error problem in the right hand side endogenous variable, which leads to an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates (see Angrist and
Krueger, 1999).
Fiscal Policy Channels
Having established a positive and robust relationship between dictatorial regimes and actual fiscal redistribution, in this section our analysis seeks to investigate the impact of political institutions on fiscal revenues as well as on the allocation of government budget between public goods and cash transfers. This allows us to place the spotlight on the potential fiscal policy channels though which redistribution takes place in different political regimes, and therefore to further clarify the puzzling -at a first glance-empirical findings presented in the previous sections. To this end, our analysis relies on three alternative databases (described below in detail), and employs as dependent variables a number of fiscal policy measures that reflect the level as well as the composition of fiscal policy. Concerning the fiscal revenues side, we employ in our analysis measures which allow us to capture the size of the tax system. More precisely, we obtain from the ICTD the variables total revenues and total tax revenues (denoted as revenues_ICTD and tax revenues_ICTD, respectively), both scaled by GDP and expressed as percentages. 22 We obtain the respective variables from the GDNGD, which are denoted as revenues_GDNGD and tax_revenues_GDNGD. According to the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) argument, we expect all these alternative variables to be negatively affected by non-democratic institutions. This is because in democracy the voting rights are extended to poorer segments of the population, which in turn increase the distance between the income of the median voter and the average income and thus the demand for fiscal redistribution (see, e. In the analysis that follows we modify the estimated equation (2) of section 3.2 as follows:
where , +4 represents a fiscal variable in country i over a five year period. The variable ℎ classifies the political regime at year t, according to the CGV, BMR, and POLITY2 variables described above. Moreover, , +4 is the vector of socio-economic variables, 23 However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Specifically, Mulligan et al., (2004) and Profeta et al., (2013) fail to provide evidence in favor of any link between political institutions and tax policy, whereas Acemoglu et al., (2015) suggest that there is a positive and robust relationship between democracy and total tax revenues. 24 For more information regarding the expenditure categories that compose the fiscal variable social security and welfare affairs and services see page 46 in the following link: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/1986/eng/pdf/ch4a.pdf 25 Unfortunately, we cannot exclude the transfers to non-profit institutions from the calculation because the database does not provide a separate classification for transfers to households and transfers to non-profit institutions.
as described in section 3.1, in country i over a five year period. Finally, and correspond to country and time fixed effects, respectively, and is the error term.
We prefer the specification of equation (6) in this section for two reasons. First and foremost, as mentioned in section 2.2, one of the reasons that we chose to take one observation of our dependent variable for each 5-year sub-period of our sample is the custom missing algorithm employed by Solt (2009) , which uses as much information as possible from proximate years within the same economy to estimate missing observations. Therefore, the strategy adopted in section 3 allows us to reduce, to the degree possible, the problems from data imputation from observations within the same country. Given that we do not face this issue with fiscal data, we resort to non-overlapping 5-year averages so as to smooth over some of the cyclical features of the data (see, e.g., Kneller et al., 1999) . Second, given that fiscal data have missing observations and gaps, taking five-year averages, instead of one observation for each 5-year period, allows us to maximize the available number of observations. It is worth mentioning that we do not estimate a dynamic specification in this section, because introducing a lagged dependent variable either does not affect our results or it reduces our sample so significantly that makes its use irrelevant.
Moreover, given that EFW database provides one observation every five years until 2000, in specifications that we employ the variable transfers_EFW, we use the first observation of each 5-year sub-period of our sample in both sides of the estimated equation.
The results for the revenue variables are presented in Table 7 , whereas those for the expenditure variables in Table 8 . As can be seen in Table 7 , Dictatorship bears a non-significant coefficient in all alternative specifications. Therefore, based on the results presented in columns (1)- (12), our analysis fails to provide evidence that political institutions influence the level of fiscal revenues. These empirical findings are in line with previous studies suggesting that political institutions do not play an important role in the design of tax policy (see, e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004; Profeta et al., 2013; Scheve and Stasavage, 2012) . Related to these results, it is worth mentioning that for brevity we do not report estimates that concern the composition of tax revenues. However, in specifications that we use direct and indirect tax revenues as dependent [Insert Table 7 , here]
In Table 8 our analysis investigates whether political institutions influence the allocation of government budget between specific type of public goods and cash transfers. As can be easily verified in columns (1)- (6), the variable Dictatorship enters with a non-significant coefficient in all alternative specifications. Therefore our analysis fails to provide any clear cut relationship between political regime and social spending accounts that include both in cash and in kind transfers (i.e., social_services_GDNGD and services_subsidies_EFW).
In contrast, the variable Dictatorship is positive and statistically significant in columns (8) and (9), where the dependent variable transfers_GDNGD includes only in cash transfers to the population. A potential issue with these estimates is that the number of observations drops significantly making more difficult to identify correctly the effect of the political regime in FE estimations. However, it should be noted that even in yearly panels, with and without the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, the qualitative effect of the political regime on transfers_GDNGD remains unaffected. Moreover, according to the results in columns (10)- (12) dictatorial regimes are negatively related to health and education spending. Therefore, our empirical findings suggest that democracies and dictatorships actually follow different patterns of redistribution through the implemented fiscal policy. More precisely, dictatorial regimes redistribute income mostly through cash transfers, whereas democratic regimes basically rely on public good services (such as health and education) and consequently redistribute income mostly through in-kind public services. To the best of our knowledge the only other study that has provided similar evidence regarding the effect of the political regime on the composition of public spending is by Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) for a sample of Latin American countries over the period . Regarding the negative effect of Dictatorship on health and education spending, our results are in line with many previous empirical studies that have provided similar evidence for these specific spending accounts (see, e.g., Ansell, 2010; Baum 24 and Lake, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Gallego, 2010; Lindert, 2004) . Finally, our control variables do not seem to depict any robust relationship with any of the fiscal variables in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 , here] Summarizing, our empirical findings presented in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that political institutions do not exert any impact on fiscal revenues or their composition, but they do influence the allocation of government spending between public goods and cash transfers. These empirical findings help us to further illuminate the puzzling -at a first glance-empirical results presented in Tables 1 to 6 . Democratic regimes rely heavier on in-kind public services (education, health) and their policies basically affect gross income inequality (i.e., Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers), whereas dictatorships redistribute income mostly through cash transfers. As a result, actual fiscal redistribution that takes place through cash transfers and taxes is expected to increase in non-democratic regimes.
A theoretical framework along the lines of McGuire and Olson (1996)
Motivated by the empirical evidence presented above, this section investigates theoretically why political regimes follow different patterns of fiscal policy. To this end, our analysis presents a simple theoretical model that builds upon Olson (1993; and McGuire and Olson (1996) , which highlights the encompassing interest of the ruler for the productivity of the whole economy as a crucial factor. More precisely, we consider an endogenous growth model where the ruler (whether democratically elected or not) decides both the level of the tax rate on income and the amount of tax revenues directed to public production services. Tax revenues that are not directed to public production services remain in the discretion of the ruler and they are used for his own purposes. Thus, these resources are affecting the welfare of the ruler either directly (by increasing his own consumption) or indirectly (by increasing his ability to "buy" political support). In any case these resources are directed away from productive activities.
Households
The intertemporal utility of the representative household is:
where c t is the private consumption at time t , and 0 1    is the discount rate.
At each time t , the household rents its predetermined capital, k t , to the firm and receives r k t t , where r t is the return to capital. It also supplies inelastically one unit of labor services per time-period so that labor income is w t . Further, it receives profits made by firms,  t . Thus, the household's budget constraint is: 
Firms
The representative firm maximizes the usual profit,  t , function:
As in the literature introduced by Barro (1990), we assume that public services provide production externalities to private firms. We also assume that technology at the firm's level takes a Cobb-Douglas form. Thus, the firm's production function is:
where t y is output at t , t l is the labor input at t , g t is public production services at t , A 0 and
The firm chooses t k and t l . In doing so, it acts competitively by taking prices and policy variables as given. The first-order conditions of the firm's problem are:
Government budget constraint
To finance the public good the ruler taxes the household's income at a rate 1 0
Without loss of generality, we assume that a share 1 0   t b of total tax revenues finances public production services, t G , and the rest
is used by the ruler for his own purposes.
Thus, these resources are used by the ruler either to finance his own consumption or to finance other non-productive activities (e.g., to "buy" political support). Thus, (13a) is decomposed into:
where inspection of (13a)-(13c) reveals that t  and t b can summarize fiscal policy at t .
Competitive decentralized equilibrium (for given economic policy)
Given the paths of the policy instruments 
In this solution, 
Optimal Fiscal Policy
We now endogenize policy by assuming that the ruler chooses the paths of t  and t b in order to maximize his own well-being (we specify ruler's objective function in Equation (9) below). In doing so the ruler takes into account the CDE as summarized by (14a)-(14e). 27 In the labor market, the market-clearing condition is 1  t l . 28 As is known, the model specification (logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas constraints with full depreciation) allows us to obtain a closed-form solution at the level of competitive decentralized equilibrium (CDE). In this equilibrium, private consumption-saving decisions are proportional to current output, and the degree of proportionality depends on the current policy instruments only.
The ruler's problem
Following McGuire and Olson (1996) we assume that the ruler (whether democratically elected or not) maximizes the following intertemporal objective function:
where 0 1    is the discount rate of the ruler and 01 F  is a parameter that captures the degree of the encompassing interest of the ruler in private consumption of the citizens and consequently in the productivity of the whole society. 29 Obviously, the second term of the objective function captures the incentive of the ruler to extract the maximum amount of resources from the public funds and to use it for his own purposes. As can be easily verified when parameter F tends to zero the ruler gains utility solely through rent extraction. 30 In contrast, when F is larger than zero, the ruler also cares for the welfare of their citizens (who earn a significant amount of their income in private markets) and this is the case of the "redistributive democracy" as defined by McGuire and Olson (1996) . 31 We will use dynamic programming to solve the ruler's problem. From the governor's point of view, the state at any time t is the predetermined economy-wide capital stock, kt . Then V(kt) denote the value function at t. This function must satisfy the Bellman equation:
where ct, kt+1 and Rt follows (14b), (14c) and (14e) respectively.
Inspection of the above problem reveals that the value function in (16) is expected to be of the log-linear form V(kt)=u0+u1logkt where u0 and u1 are undetermined coefficients. Using this 29 Olson (1993) suggests that in democratic regimes candidates need a majority to win and they might be able to "buy" a majority by transferring income from the population to this prospective majority. However, the competition for vote buying will not generate that large distortion of incentives through taxation as in autocracies. This is because in democracies the majority earns a significant share of the market income of the society and this gives to the democratically elected government a more encompassing interest the function of the private markets and consequently in the productivity of the economy. 30 According to McGuire and Olson (1996) this is the case of a "pure autocracy". 31 Though essentially ad hoc, this characterization of policy-makers' preferences is a convenient way of encompassing a wide range of possibilities by supposing that policy makers are neither wholly benevolent nor wholly self-serving Leviathan (see, e.g., Edwards and Keen, 1996 for more details on this).
conjecture for the value function into (16), the first order conditions for θt and bt are respectively:
As can be easily verified, the chosen policy instruments are independent of the state of the economy kt and they are constant over time θt=θ and bt=b for all t. Moreover, we note that
.Thus a higher encompassing interest of the ruler in private consumption and consequently in the productivity of the private markets leads: (i) to lower level of tax rates and
(ii) to higher share of tax revenues used to finance public production services relative to rents' extraction. It is worth noted that higher tax rates do not necessarily induce higher tax revenues. This is because in this model national income (i.e., the tax base) apparently is endogenous to the implemented fiscal policy.
Our results are in line to those obtained by McGuire and Olson (1996) . Rulers that are characterized by a lower encompassing interest in the welfare of the citizens -and consequently in the productivity of the whole society-direct a lower share of the tax revenues to public production services and they impose higher tax rates. In contrast, governments that do care for the function of the private markets direct a larger amount of resources to public production services and extract less from the public funds. Following the rationale of Olson (1993) and McGuire and Olson (1996) autocracies are characterized by a lower encompassing interest in the function of the private markets. Therefore, autocracies direct a lower share of the tax revenues to public production services and extract more from the public funds for political economy purposes.
Conclusions
Our analysis examines the relationship between political institutions and fiscal redistribution for a maximum of 144 developed and developing countries between 1960 and 2010. Backed by strong empirical findings, obtained from several different specifications and robustness checks, we suggest that dictatorial regimes redistribute more than democracies through taxes and cash transfers. Subsequently, our analysis provides some insights about this empirical finding.
Focusing on the potential fiscal policy channels though which redistribution takes place, we conclude that democracies and dictatorships follow different patterns to redistribute income.
More precisely, dictatorships redistribute income mostly through cash transfers, whereas democratic regimes rely more on public good services (e.g. health, education).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that employs a measure of actual fiscal redistribution, whereas at the same time attempts to enlighten the fiscal policy channels through which political regimes redistribute income. In this sense, our findings contribute to the well-established agenda studying the interplay between political institutions and fiscal redistribution (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Boix, 2003) . However, since investigating the influence of the political regime on income redistribution that takes place through fiscal policies is a highly complicated and ambitious research agenda, these empirical findings call for a deeper understanding of the specific interand intra-country mechanisms that create these patterns and this is an issue that definitely warrants future research. Notes: All models control for GDP per capita, age dependency and openness, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. In Panel A we repeat the estimates of Table  1 after dropping 10% of the observations that are associated with the higher uncertainty in the inequality data estimates. In Panel B we drop from estimates in Table 1 all Sub-Saharan Africa countries, whereas in Panel C we drop the first two decades of our sample. In the GMM the variable fiscal redistributiont-1 is instrumented with second and further lags, whereas all other covariates are treated as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR (2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. Notes: In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. 2SLS are estimated using the variable Democracy Abroad and the first lag of the variable Dictatorship as instruments. The F-stat is the F statistics for the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in first stage regressions, whereas the overidentification test is the p-value of the Hansen J test of the validity of the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. (6) as described in section 5, taking five year averages for all variables except for the variable Dictatorship that we use value t of each five-year period (t, t+4) of our sample. In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. (3)and (7)- (12) we estimate equation (6) as described in section 5, taking five year averages for all variables except for the variable Dictatorship that we use value t of each five year period (t,t+4) of our sample. In columns (4)-(6) that EFW database provides one observation every five years until year 2000, we use the initial year t for both the left and right hand side variables of equation (6). In all specifications we control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.
